I went to Colombia in August because of my interest in drug policy. Our small group (twelve) spent a week in the impoverished southern province of Putamayo, talking to farmers, activists, bureaucrats, cops and soldiers. We also had discussions with and presentations by various people in Bogota – including representatives of the U.S. embassy. All of that brought home to me that coca growing and the preparation of cocaine paste by camposinos, typically scrabbling an existence out of a hectare or two of less-than-prime land, is only one, albeit important, aspect of the overall collapse of a beautiful and diseased country.

The history behind the present mess is quite typical of Latin American countries in general. They were settled by an aristocracy that appropriated the land, marginalized – or eradicated – indigenous populations and established a system that was feudal in all but name. Sort of like we were - at the beginning. But then we accepted swarms of immigrants to open up the west and speed industrialization in the east, in the process broadening the political base and creating a middle class that insured the continuation of British and French democratic ideals. The Iberians, on the contrary, continued the domestic prominence of military might and strove to replicate the top-down rule that prevailed at home.

What’s more, there’s no escaping stereotyping here. Although I’ve never forgotten the admonition of a history professor who scrawled on one of my papers, Stay away from ‘national characteristics’! They’re dangerous! I’m absolutely convinced that there is in the cultural make-up of South American leaders, a willingness, if not an eagerness, to settle differences by chopping each other to pieces.

In support of that bit of cultural profiling, I’ll cite La Violencia, a pivotal point in Colombian history. After a long stretch of back-and-forth repression/rebellion, typical of most of Latin America throughout the 19th century, Colombia settled into a sort of tentative stability that overcame, for almost half a century, the inevitable stresses and strains of democratic rule. But it could never last. There were only two parties, Liberal and Conservative; and increasing corruption and chicanery on both sides stretched to the limit their ability to co-exist. It all finally blew up in 1948 with the assassination of the Liberal presidential candidate. La Violencia was born; and over the next five years, over 300,000 Colombians died throughout the country for supporting, or being suspected of supporting, the other side (that continues to be an endemic problem, but in a new context).

Not surprisingly, the army was invited to take over in 1953. It ruled until 1964, when the Liberals and Conservatives kissed and made up and created the National Front. That was a structured power-sharing scheme that did some good. The army, as in Turkey, kept a wary eye on them. But this power-sharing did not do enough good to prevent the emergence of leftist rebels.

Enter the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The first is the most widespread. With about 18,000 members, it is the largest rebel army in the hemisphere and has traditionally operated in rural areas, principally Putamayo. The ELN is a smaller and more urban offshoot of the Cuban revolution, although both came into being in 1964, energized by the success in Cuba. The ELN is no longer of serious concern to the government. But FARC, receiving some financial assistance from the USSR during the cold war, established itself as a friend of the camposino, avoiding then – but no longer - some of the excesses that infected other movements of the 60s and 70s. It successfully kept the army off balance.

In response to the guerillas, landowners formed their own paramilitary organizations. They had very limited success against FARC but they became renowned for their brutality and were responsible for the assassination of huge numbers of labour leaders, leftist activists and local politicians throughout the 80’s. They were declared outlaw organizations in ’89 but, in the background, the military became intertwined with them and essentially established a form of mutual cooperation: they would ignore the paras’ excesses and, in turn, the paras would help the army and police in their efforts against FARC.

For the camposinos the result of that (and of Plan Colombia, which I’ll get to soon) has been enormous internal displacement. Fleeing from the impossible pressure of one side or the other and from aerial fumigation, people have flocked to the cities. Today, there are a little over 3 million displaced persons in Colombia – a bit more than two thirds of that in Bogota. Only Darfur is worse. This is an agrarian economy, with about three quarters of the population living on the land, so the mass exodus has had a devastating effect on social as well as economic structures.

...To be Continued